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 NOTES
 REDEFINING "COMMON CARRIER": THE
 FCC's ATTEMPT AT DEREGULATION
 BY REDEFINITION
 Title II of the Communications Act of 19341 (the Communications
 Act) codified a number of requirements and duties applicable to those
 organizations that provide communication services and created the Fed-
 eral Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to enforce
 those duties. Title II2 has become the foundation for a vast network of
 regulations imposed on common carriers in the communications indus-
 try.3 The definition of "common carrier" is therefore integral to the
 workings of the Communications Act. The language of the Communica-
 tions Act itself sheds little light on the definition, as the term "common
 carrier" is defined at section 3(h) simply as "any person engaged as a
 common carrier for hire."4 From this statutory language, the Commis-
 sion derives an equally unilluminating regulatory definition of a commu-
 nication common carrier: "Any person engaged in rendering
 communication service for hire to the public."5
 The terse and somewhat circular definition of common carrier satis-
 fied Congress. While debating how to regulate communication common
 carriers, Senator La Follette declared "telegraph and telephone compa-
 nies ... have a defined meaning in the law, and I do not believe it would
 include anything else."6 Unfortunately, Senator La Follette's forecast
 has not been sustained by time: the FCC claims that the supplied defini-
 tions are no longer useful.7
 Since 1979 the FCC has been seeking ways to ease or entirely re-
 move the requirements that Title II imposes on communication common
 1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
 U.S.C. ? 151 (1982)).
 2. Id. ?? 201-221, 48 Stat. at 1071-81 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ?? 201-221 (1982)).
 3. See 47 C.F.R. ?? 21.0-69.611 (1986).
 4. Communications Act ? 3(h), 48 Stat. at 1066 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 153(h) (1982)).
 5. 47 C.F.R. ? 21.2 (1986).
 6. 45 CONG. REC. 6976 (1910).
 7. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities
 Authorizations Therefor, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 359 (1979) (Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemak-
 ing) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry] (this proceeding will be referred to as the Competitive Carrier
 proceeding).
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 carriers.8 The FCC recently has proposed narrowing the application of
 Title II by redefining the term "common carrier" so as to exclude most
 currently regulated communication providers.9 This note examines the
 Commission's effort to redefine the term "common carrier" and con-
 cludes that such action contradicts the expressed intent of Congress10
 and creates confusion and uncertainty in the industry." The note ini-
 tially examines the FCC's effort to achieve deregulation through redefini-
 tion,12 and reviews the historical development of the term "common
 carrier"'13 in order to determine who Congress intended to regulate under
 Title II. Then, using guidelines established in recent Supreme Court de-
 cisions, the note demonstrates that the FCC's attempt to deregulate by
 redefinition exceeds its authority under Title 11.14 Finally, the note dis-
 cusses the policy problems that the FCC's actions present.15
 I. TITLE II REQUIREMENTS
 The regulations set forth in Title II can be divided into roughly
 three categories: duties of common carriers, liabilities of common carri-
 ers, and economic regulations. The Communications Act imposes the
 duty on a common carrier16 to provide service "upon reasonable re-
 quest"17 at rates that are "just and reasonable,"'18 "without unjust or un-
 reasonable discrimination" or "unreasonable preference or advantage" to
 any party.19 The liabilities of common carriers are set out in section 206
 of the Communications Act,20 which provides a remedy for costs caused
 by delay in the delivery of a message,21 costs associated with discrimina-
 8. Id. at 309-11.
 9. Id. at 363-68. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
 10. See infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
 11. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
 12. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
 13. See infra notes 58-94 and accompanying text.
 14. See infra notes 118-155 and accompanying text.
 15. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
 16. Cases discussing the early common law development of these duties are listed infra notes
 66-67.
 17. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 201(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 (codified at
 47 U.S.C. ? 201(a) (1982)).
 18. Id. ? 201(b), 48 Stat. at 1070 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 201(b) (1982)).
 19. Id. ? 202(a), 48 Stat. at 1070 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 202(a) (1982)). See Notice oflnquiry,
 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 312 (1977) (sections 201 and 202 are standards by which the Commission deter-
 mines the lawfulness of tariffs). A further duty created solely by the legislation concerns the relation
 of common carriers to national defense. See Act of June 25, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-659, 54 Stat. 570
 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. ? 210(b) (1982)).
 20. Communications Act ? 206, 48 Stat. at 1072 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 206 (1982)).
 21. See Jeremias v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Ga. App. 142, 144-45, 50 S.E.2d 797, 798-99
 (1948).
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 tion in service,22 attorney fees in court actions,23 and punitive damages.24
 Economic regulations govern the business relations of common car-
 riers. For example, tariff regulations require common carriers to file all
 tariffs25 with the Commission and also to make them available for public
 examination.26 The Commission must receive ninety days notice before
 changes may be made to the tariff schedule.27 Upon submission, the
 Commission may hold hearings to determine whether these new tariffs
 are unlawful and void.28 Common carriers must also file for FCC ap-
 proval of new services, routes or transmission lines.29
 The national emphasis on deregulation has focused public attention
 on many of these economic regulations.30 Those who favor deregulation
 posit that these regulations inhibit the development of a competitive in-
 dustry by forcing carriers to disclose both tariff information and plans to
 expand or develop new routes to other providers, who not only benefit
 from advanced knowledge of competitors' plans, but can also challenge
 the legality of the submissions in lengthy and costly proceedings.31 They
 also believe Title II's filing regulations impose high compliance costs on
 common carriers, which are passed on to the taxpayer and the con-
 sumer.32 Furthermore, they argue that the lack of flexibility in pricing
 discourages new entrants to the industry and allows collusion between
 existing carriers.33
 II. THE FCC's DRIVE TOWARDS DEREGULATION
 In 1979, the FCC initiated an inquiry into the benefits and methods
 22. In re Edwards Indus., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 322, 328 (1979).
 23. See WSAZ, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 31 F.C.C. 175, 194 (1961).
 24. In re Richard Johnson, 18 F.C.C.2d 679, 681 (1969). Title II as a whole has been inter-
 preted as placing actions for negligence by common carriers within the jurisdiction of federal courts.
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Junker, 153 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
 25. Tariffs are "[s]chedules of rates and [rules governing the offering of services] filed by com-
 mon carriers." 47 C.F.R. ? 61.23 (1986).
 26. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 203(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1070-71 (codi-
 fied at 47 U.S.C. ? 203(a) (1982)). See 47 C.F.R. ? 61 (1986).
 27. Communications Act ? 203(b), 48 Stat. at 1071 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. ? 203(b)
 (1982)).
 28. Id. ? 204, 48 Stat. at 1071-72 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 204 (1982)).
 29. Id. ? 214(a), 48 Stat. at 1075-76 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 214(a) (1982)). See 47 C.F.R. ? 63
 (1986). Other economic regulations concern mergers, acquisitions, and other general business prac-
 tices of common carriers. Communications Act ?? 211-221, 48 Stat. at 1073-81 (codified as
 amended at 47 U.S.C. ?? 211-221 (1982)). See 47 C.F.R. ?? 31-35 (1986).
 30. Hillman, Telecommunications Deregulation: The Martyrdom of the Regulated Monopolist,
 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1183, 1183-84 (1985). See Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 312-15 (1977)
 (discussing economic regulation of common carriers).
 31. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 313 (1977).
 32. Id. at 358.
 33. Id.
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 of deregulating common carrier services.34 In its Notice of Inquiry and
 Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission observed that the communica-
 tions industry had changed greatly since passage of the Communications
 Act in 1934; in particular, technological innovations had led to the intro-
 duction of diverse and possibly competitive services.35 The Commission
 feared that Title II's regulations imposed unnecessary costs and created
 barriers to entry, thereby diminishing both the variety of services avail-
 able to the public and the possibility that a truly competitive marketplace
 would develop.36 Two methods of deregulation were proposed. The first
 was forbearance, which would allow the FCC in certain situations to re-
 frain from enforcing compliance with all but minimal Title II regula-
 tions.37 The second proposal was to redefine the term common carrier,
 thus removing certain communication services from Title II require-
 ments altogether.38
 Although the Commission realized that the definitional approach
 went further towards deregulation,39 the Commission initially indicated
 it planned to use forbearance.40 In its First Report and Order, the Com-
 mission "streamlined" the regulatory requirements applicable to those
 the Commission considered "non-dominant common carriers."41 Carri-
 ers that lack sufficient market power to raise prices artificially or to dis-
 criminate against customers were classified as non-dominant carriers,
 and were required to satisfy only minimal Title II requirements.42 By
 contrast, the Commission treated "carriers that have market power (i.e.
 power to control price)" as dominant carriers, which continued to bear
 the full burden of Title II regulation.43
 34. Id. at 309.
 35. Id. at 359.
 36. Id. at 309.
 37. Id. at 359-63.
 38. Id. at 363-68.
 39. Id. at 359.
 40. The Commission has not explained why it chose to begin with forbearance rather than
 redefinition, and has noted only that it plans to deal with redefinition in future orders. Policy and
 Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations
 Therefor, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 62 n.7 (1982) (Second Report and Order) [hereinafter Second Report].
 41. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities
 Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 50 (1980) (First Report and Order).
 42. Id. at 20-21. See also 47 C.F.R. ? 61.12(e) (1986) (defining "Non-dominant carrier").
 43. 85 F.C.C.2d at 20. See also 47 C.F.R. ? 61.12(c) (1986) (defining "Dominant carrier").
 The Commission commented that "[a] firm with market power is able to engage in conduct that may
 be anticompetitive . . . . This may entail setting price above competitive costs in order to earn
 supranormal profits, or setting price below competitive costs to forestall entry by new competitors or
 to eliminate existing competitors." 85 F.C.C.2d at 21. It is interesting to compare this market
 approach with the market-based definition by which the Commission posited that some services are
 not common carriers. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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 In the Second Report and Order, streamlined regulations gave way
 to "permissive" forbearance. Resellers of basic terrestrial communica-
 tion services were permitted (but not required) to cancel their tariffs and
 conduct their business arrangements on a private contractual basis.44
 The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Reports and Orders extended permissive
 forbearance to virtually every common carrier determined to be non-
 dominant.45
 The Sixth Report and Order imposed mandatory forbearance. It
 ordered all non-dominant carriers to cancel their existing tariffs and to
 refrain from filing new tariff schedules.46 The United States Court of
 Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which specifically declined
 to examine permissive forbearance,47 held the Sixth Report and Order
 unlawful in light of the language of the Communications Act.48 The
 court noted that the Communications Act required every common car-
 rier to "file with the Commission and print and keep open for public
 inspection schedules showing all charges for itself and its connecting
 carriers. "49
 The court's literal interpretation of the statutory language has sug-
 gested to at least one commentator that judicial consideration of permis-
 sive forbearance-and possibly even streamlined regulation-would yield
 the same result.50 Thus, although still in force, the deregulatory tech-
 nique chosen by the FCC has been stalled short of what the Commission
 hoped to achieve.
 In the meantime, the definitional approach to deregulation, which
 the Commission promulgated in the first Notice for the Competitive Car-
 rier proceeding, had not been abandoned. One year after the first Notice,
 the Commission issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which
 44. See Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d at 73 (1982).
 45. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authori-
 zations Therefor, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791, 46,792 (1983) (Third Report and Order) (extending forbear-
 ance to "carriers providing service to domestic points outside the continental United States"); Policy
 and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations
 Therefor, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 557 (1983) (Fourth Report and Order) (extending forbearance to all
 resellers and specialized common carriers); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
 Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 1209 (1984)
 (Fifth Report and Order) (applying forbearance to carriers affiliated with exchange telephone com-
 panies, to domestic satellites, to miscellaneous common carriers, and to digital transmission
 networks).
 46. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities
 Authorizations Therefor, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1027 (1985) (Sixth Report and Order).
 47. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
 48. Id. at 1195.
 49. Id. at 1191 (quoting 47 U.S.C. ? 203(a) (1982)).
 50. May, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC: A Roadblock or Merely a Bump on the Road
 to Deregulation?, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 51, 58-59 (1986).
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 again solicited comments on redefining the term "common carrier.""5
 Although adoption of the forbearance technique made it unnecessary for
 the Commission to issue any orders invoking the definitional theory in
 the Competitive Carrier proceeding itself,52 the theory's structure has
 been fairly well articulated,53 and in fact pervades several recent FCC
 actions.54
 Specifically, the theory suggests that the definition of the term com-
 mon carrier should be based on the market strength of the provider: a
 non-dominant provider would not be considered a common carrier under
 this approach.55 This technique is similar to forbearance,56 differing only
 in that it completely removes non-dominant carriers from Title II reg-
 ulation.57 To understand fully the significance of the Commission's defi-
 nitional approach, it is necessary first to examine the historical
 development of the term "common carrier."
 III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERM
 "COMMON CARRIER"
 The history of section 3(h) of the Communications Act begins in the
 ports of Restoration England. In 1670, Lord Chief Justice Hale wrote
 that the ports of England were touched by three types of rights: jus
 privatum (proprietary rights), jus publicum (the common interest), and
 jus regium (the prerogative of the King).58 Lord Hale recognized the
 possible conflicts among the three types of rights; in his explanation he
 ranked each of them. He described the King's rights, jus regium, which
 should be understood as more analogous to the interests of a centralized
 51. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities
 Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 517-19 (1981) (Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking)
 [hereinafter Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
 52. Burch, Common Carrier Communications by Wire and Radio: A Retrospective, 37 FED.
 COMM. L.J. 85, 103 (1985) (Commission's "end run" use of forbearance precluded consideration of
 the definitional issue).
 53. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
 54. See, e.g., Cox Cable Communications, Inc., 102 F.C.C.2d 110, 121-22 (1985) (using market
 power analysis to determine whether carrier should be treated as a common carrier); International
 Competitive Carrier Policies, 102 F.C.C.2d 812, 829-30 (1985) (using market power analysis to de-
 termine whether Title II should apply to communication service).
 55. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 365 (1979).
 56. See Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d at 463 ("Because both the 'defini-
 tional' and forbearance approaches seek ultimately to identify the carriers and services to which Title
 II obligations should apply ... the two approaches may actually be viewed as complementary sides
 of the same coin.").
 57. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 363.
 58. Hale, A Treatise in Three Parts, in 1 COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF
 ENGLAND 1, 72 (F. Hargrave ed. 1787).
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 government than as a proprietary right held by the King qua King,59 as
 superintendent to the other two.60
 The interaction between the two remaining types of rights intro-
 duced the concept of public interest in privately held businesses. While
 the operator of a wharf or dock was free to profit from his proprietary
 interest, jus privatum,6' Lord Hale held that the jus privatum was
 "cloathed and superinduced with ajus publicum. "62 Lord Hale argued
 that the public right conflicted with and superseded the private right in
 ports inasmuch as:
 1. They ought to be free and open for subjects and foreigners, to
 come and go with their merchandise ....
 2. There ought to be no new tolls or charges imposed upon them
 without sufficient warrant, nor the old inhanced ....
 3. They ought to be preserved from impediments and nusances, that
 may hinder or annoy the access or abode or recess of ships, and vessels,
 and seamen, or the unlading or relading of goods.63
 Lord Hale explained and developed the concept of a private business
 affected by a public interest in his classic work, The Analysis of Law.64
 He wrote that actions arising under a theory of implied contract could be
 brought against "[p]ersons that undertake a Common Trust, " including
 common hosts, common "farriers," and common carriers.65 Thus, Lord
 Hale's writings show two important aspects of a private business that
 serves a public interest: the infusion ofjus publicum into an otherwise
 private undertaking, and a duty to perform the service in a manner that
 complies with public expectations.
 59. For example, when explaining why seaports could not be erected without royal permission,
 Lord Hale commented that "the safety of the kingdom, the commerce of the kingdom . . . are
 concerned in it. Merchants and seamen of all parts and quarters of the world are let into the king-
 dom publicly, and under the publick protection in a publick port; and consequently it is not within
 the extent of a jurisdiction palantine de novo to erect a publick port." Id. at 53.
 60. Id. at 72.
 61. Id. at 74-75.
 62. Id. at 84.
 63. Id. These duties are strikingly similar to those mandated for common carriers in sections
 201 and 202 of the Communications Act. The Code dictates that "[i]t shall be the duty of every
 common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication ... to furnish such communication
 service upon reasonable request . . . . It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any
 unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or
 services . . ." 47 U.S.C. ?? 201-202 (1982).
 64. M. HALE, THE ANALYSIS OF LAW (1713).
 65. Id. at 123. The duties of hotelkeepers evolved into an elaborate body of common law. See
 N. COURNOYER & A. MARSHALL, HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND TRAVEL LAW 4-7 (2d ed. 1983)
 (discussing the history of hotel common law). The duties of ferrymen remained closely tied to the
 duties of other common carriers of goods and passengers. See T. CHITTY & L. TEMPLE, A PRACTI-
 CAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS BY LAND, INLAND NAVI-
 GATION, AND IN SHIPS *2, *8 (1857) (discussing duties of carriers "by land and inland navigation").
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 English66 and early American jurisprudence67 largely defined com-
 mon carriers in the context of special liabilities attached to those who
 were labelled as such. Although the liabilities of common carriers re-
 mained unsettled for some time,68 a working definition of common car-
 rier emerged as early as 1710.69 By the mid-1800s, working definitions
 coalesced into a standard. Tompson Chitty and Leofric Temple wrote
 that:
 To render a person liable as a common carrier, he must exercise the
 business of carrying as a "public employment," and must undertake to
 carry goods for all persons indiscriminately; and hold himself out as
 ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire as a business,
 and not as a casual occupation pro hac vice. 70
 This definition was widely accepted,71 and like all contemporary defini-
 tions of the term was based solely on the nature of the carrier and not on
 the market positions of individual common carriers.72
 Because the early common law definitions of common carrier as-
 66. Pozzi v. Shipton, 8 Ad. & E. 963, 974-75, 112 Eng. Rep. 1106, 1110-11 (Q.B. 1838) (hold-
 ing strict liability of common carriers to be the custom, and therefore the law of England); Buddle v.
 Willson, 6 Term R. 369, 373, 3 Rev. Rep. 202, 206 (K.B. 1795) (cause of action against common
 carriers held to be ex contractu); Forward v. Pittard, 1 Term R. 27, 33-34, 1 Rev. Rep. 142, 147-48
 (K.B. 1785) (discussing common carriers' liability for acts of man, and holding common carrier
 liable for damage to goods caused by an accidental fire); Aimes v. Stevens, 1 Strange 128, 128, 93
 Eng. Rep. 428, 428 (K.B. 1719) (ruling common carriers not liable for "acts of God").
 67. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 381-83 (1848)
 (discussing effect of special agreement on liabilities of common carrier); Pomeroy v. Donaldson, 5
 Mo. 36, 38-39 (1837) (discussing liabilities of common carriers for negligence, gross negligence and
 negligence of the customer); Bank of Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158, 162 (N.Y. 1829) (discussing
 liabilities imposed on common carrier by implied contract that it will carry goods safely); Eagle v.
 White, 6 Whart. 505, 516-17 (Pa. 1841) (discussing time at which common carriers' liabilities are
 discharged).
 68. See J. ANGELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS, BY
 LAND AND BY WATER ? 68 (1849) (special liabilities of common carriers unsettled from reign of
 Queen Elizabeth to reign of Queen Anne).
 69. Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249, 250, 91 Eng. Rep. 220, 220 (1710) ("[A]ny man undertak-
 ing for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently . . . is . . . a common carrier.").
 70. T. CHITTY & L. TEMPLE, supra note 65, at *14-*15 (emphasis in original). This language
 is reflected in the discussion of communication common carriers in National Ass'n of Regulatory
 Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). See infra
 notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
 71. E.g., R. HUTCHINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS ? 47 (1879); J. STORY, LAW
 OF BAILMENTS ? 495 (1832); J. ANGELL., supra note 68, at ? 68. Hutchinson noted that "[t]hese
 definitions are substantially the same and are adopted and used indifferently." R. HUTCHINSON,
 supra ? 47 n.1. Courts also accepted the definition. E.g., Dwight v. Brewster, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 50,
 55 (1822); Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.Y. 341, 342 (1867); Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 Watts & Serg. 285,
 286 (Pa. 1841).
 72. The FCC argues rather elaborately that the development of the term common carrier could
 be looked at in economic terms. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
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 sumed that the entity in question actually carried something,73 some
 commentators and courts struggled to incorporate telegraph and tele-
 phone service within the concept of common carrier.74 The Illinois
 Supreme Court, for example, agonized over the characteristics of telegra-
 phy, and finally concluded that although telegraph providers should not
 be labelled common carriers, they were so analogous as to be held to the
 same standards.75 By contrast, the California Supreme Court had little
 difficulty conceptualizing telegraph and telephone service as common
 carriers. In language elegantly reminiscent of Lord Hale, the court con-
 cluded that:
 The rules of law which govern the liability of telegraph companies are
 not new. They are old rules applied to new circumstances. Such com-
 panies hold themselves out to the public as engaged in a particular
 branch of business, in which the interests of the public are deeply con-
 cerned. They propose to do a certain service for a given price. There
 is no difference in the general nature of the legal obligation of the con-
 tract between carrying a message along a wire and carrying goods or
 packages along a route. The physical agency may be different, but the
 essential nature of the contract is the same.76
 Although Congress did not immediately resolve the confusion con-
 cerning communication common carriers, it did enact the Interstate
 Commerce Act in 1887, which codified the duties and liabilities of com-
 mon carriers.77 Although the Interstate Commerce Act dealt exclusively
 with railways, it is integral to the history of communication common
 carrier law because it served as Congress's initial basis for regulating
 communications78 and provided many of the definitions found in the
 Communications Act.79
 Through the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress created the Inter-
 state Commerce Commission (ICC), and in 1888 it gave the ICC the
 73. See I. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS, PRIVATE AND
 PUBLIC, INLAND AND FOREIGN, BY RAILWAY, STEAMBOAT, AND OTHER MODES OF TRANSPOR-
 TATION ? 20 (1869) (describing the "transport from place to place" of goods and passengers as an
 element of common carrier status).
 74. Redfield, for example, divided his work into separate sections on carriers and telegraph. It
 is notable that although Redfield did not consider telegraph companies to be carriers, he found them
 to have almost identical duties. Id. at 398. See also I. BROWNE, THE ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF
 BAILMENTS AND COMMON CARRIERS 93 (1896) (stating that telegraph and telephone companies are
 not common carriers).
 75. Tyler, Ullman & Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60 Ill. 421, 431 (1871). See also Leonard
 v. New York, Albany & Buffalo Electro Magnetic Tel. Co., 41 N.Y. 544, 569-70 (1870) (holding that
 telegraph companies are not common carriers, but are subject to similar law).
 76. Parks v. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 423, 424-25 (1859).
 77. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended throughout 49
 U.S.C. (1982)).
 78. S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
 79. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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 power to regulate telegraph companies.80 Congress extended the ICC's
 authority, however, only to those telegraph lines that had been subsi-
 dized by the government. Congress did not discuss the status of tele-
 graph companies as common carriers.81
 The Mann-Elkins Act of 191082 resolved whether telegraphs and
 telephones were classified as common carriers. While working out a
 compromise bill completely reshaping regulation of the railroads and cre-
 ating the first court that would review only agency decisions,83 the House
 gave the ICC regulatory control of telegraph and telephone services.84
 The bill as enacted not only gave the ICC control over communications,
 it also decreed telegraph and telephone providers to be common
 carriers.85
 Unfortunately, the bill did not define "common carrier."86 The
 minimal floor debate concerning communications, however, helps to ex-
 plain congressional intent. Representative Mann, who opposed ex-
 tending regulation, argued that telegraph and telephone services were not
 common carriers because they did not involve the transportation of pas-
 sengers or property.87 Representative Underwood disagreed and argued
 that "the telegraph line and the telephone line are becoming rapidly as
 much a part of the instruments of commerce and as much a necessity in
 commercial life as the railroads."88 Representative Bartlett, who pro-
 posed the amendment, further argued that "the messages that are trans-
 mitted are property," and went on to recite those liabilities of
 communication services that were identical to the liabilities of common
 carriers.89 Representatives Underwood and Bartlett prevailed, and the
 80. Act of Aug. 7, 1888, ch. 772, ? 3, 25 Stat. 382, 383.
 81. Section 6 of this act required subsidized telegraph companies to file their business contracts
 with the ICC, foreshadowing the complex tariff requirements later promulgated by the FCC. Id.
 ? 6, 25 Stat. at 384 (current version codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 9 (1982)).
 82. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
 83. See B. SCHWARTZ, 2 THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 1007
 (1973).
 84. 45 CONG. REC. 5533 (1910) (amendment to H.R. 17536 by Rep. Bartlett). The Senate
 considered a wholesale adoption of the House amendment, id. at 6973 (statement of Sen. Dixon), but
 instead deferred detailed legislation to the joint conference and adopted a shorter amendment ac-
 knowledging ICC jurisdiction over telegraph and telephone, id. at 6976 (statement of Sen. Dixon).
 See also S. 6737, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. ? 11, 45 CONG. REC. 7273, 7283-84 (1910) (labelling telegraph
 and telephone providers as common carriers).
 85. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, ? 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544 (1910).
 86. The Act does list services to be included in the term common carrier, but it does not pro-
 vide a general definition of the term. Id.
 87. 45 CONG. REC. 5533 (1910). See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
 88. 45 CONG. REC. at 5534.
 89. Id. at 5536. Representative Hobson said:
 a telegraph message or a telephone message is property. But even if it were not the trans-
 portation of property, there is no reason why a measure that regulates intercommunication,
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 House voted to include telegraph and telephone providers under the ru-
 bric of "common carrier."90 Once again, it is important to note, debate
 focused only upon the nature of the carriers, and did not examine the
 market dominance of individual providers.
 The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Mann-Elkins Act,
 directly preceded the Communications Act of 1934.91 Although the leg-
 islative history of section 3(h) of the Communications Act is brief and
 does not expressly define common carrier, the Conference Report noted
 that "the definition does not include any person if not a common carrier
 in the ordinary sense of the term. "92 The facial circularity of contempo-
 rary definitions of common carrier suggests that there was indeed an "or-
 dinary sense" of the phrase,93 so that Congress did not believe it needed
 to provide a precise definition. Indeed, comments of various legislators
 during floor debate uniformly suggest that Congress transferred the
 meaning of the term common carrier intact from its use in the amended
 Interstate Commerce Act.94
 that regulates commerce, should not embrace these messages.... Messages are classified,
 and are more easily classified than freight. The same underlying principle of reasonable-
 ness of rates apply [sic] to the regulation of both.
 Id.
 The analysis of Bartlett and Hobson mirrored the scholarly thinking of that period. See J.
 ALLDREDGE, RATE-MAKING FOR COMMON CARRIERS ? 69 (1929) ("Telegraph companies belong
 to a special class of common carriers. . . . They transmit rather than transport."); id. at ? 73 (tele-
 phones also special class of common carriers).
 90. 45 CONG. REC. 5537 (1910).
 91. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, which created the Federal Radio
 Commission and mandated regulation of radio, was also incorporated into the Communications Act.
 However, the Radio Act did not address communication common carriers.
 As previously mentioned, the Interstate Commerce Act did not provide a definition of a com-
 mon carrier but instead merely described services that would be considered as common carriage.
 Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, ? 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
 ? 10102 (1982)). Workable definitions of the term common carrier were later provided by amend-
 ment and case law. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
 Servs. and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 304-08 (1976) (Report and Order) (discussing use of the term
 common carrier by the ICC and stating that ICC use was precedential for FCC purposes).
 92. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934) (emphasis added), reprinted in
 [Current Service] Rad. Reg. (P & F) ?10:1011.
 93. Legal treatises of the period continued to use the definition of common carrier that had
 emerged in the mid-1800s: one who holds himself out indiscriminately as a carrier for hire. See,
 e.g., W. ELLIOT, LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS ? 122 (W. Hemingway 2d ed. 1929); E. GOD-
 DARD, LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS ?? 191-192 (C. Cullen 2d ed. 1928). Congress took a
 similar approach with the word "railroad" in the Interstate Commerce Act. See 45 CONG. REC.
 5892 (1910) (statement of Rep. Mann) ("[A] railroad corporation is not defined in the act to regulate
 commerce.").
 94. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8823 (1934) (statements of Sen. Dill); id. at 10,313 (statement of
 Rep. Rayburn). See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (definitions in section 3 taken
 from Radio Act, Interstate Commerce Act, and international broadcasting conventions).
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 IV. MODERN APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION OF
 COMMUNICATION COMMON CARRIER
 The legal definition of a communication common carrier has not
 engendered a large body of case law.95 The few modern court decisions
 adhere to the common law elements of common carrier. The Supreme
 Court, for example, in determining that cable television systems could
 not be forced into the role of common carrier, commented that "[a] com-
 mon carrier service in the communications context is one that 'makes a
 public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all mem-
 bers of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate
 or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing.' "96
 Over ten years ago, in National Association of Regulatory Utility
 Commissioners v. FCC97 (NAR UC), the United States Court of Appeals
 for the District of Columbia Circuit grappled with the issue of common
 carrier status under the Communications Act. The court relied on com-
 mon law notions of a common carrier's quasi-public nature in concluding
 that a common carrier was one who both holds itself out indiscriminately
 for hire by the public and transmits information exactly as it is given by
 the client.98 A carrier need not, according to the NAR UC court, actually
 serve the entire public, or even be of possible use to more than a small
 segment in order to satisfy the definition. Thus, in defining common car-
 rier under the Communications Act, the court distinguished between
 those that offer to serve all comers and those that "make individualized
 decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal."99
 Although the Commission has used the NAR UC definition to deter-
 mine common carrier status in some proceedings,100 the Commission has
 not embraced NAR UC so wholeheartedly as to abandon its search for a
 definition that might better suit its goals. The Notice which opened the
 95. See Burch, supra note 52, at 102 (legal definition of common carrier a novel issue raised by
 Commission's procompetitive policy).
 96. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979).
 97. 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
 98. Id. at 640-42. This definition has been well followed in later decisions. See, e.g., Computer
 and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1982); American Tel. &
 Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1978).
 99. NARUC, 525 F.2d at 641. See Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1471
 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pointing to this distinction as central to the common carrier concept).
 100. Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. and
 Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 308 (1976) (Report and Order), issued shortly after the NAR UC deci-
 sion, used the NAR UC definition as determinative of common carrier status. The Commission's
 reluctance to adopt NAR UC as the standard, however, can be seen in such proceedings as Detariffing
 of Billing and Collection Serv., 102 F.C.C.2d 1150, 1155 & n. 15 (1986) (Report and Order), in which
 the Commission mentions NAR UC in a footnote as one standard proposed by commentors to the
 proceeding, and expresses neither approval nor disapproval.
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 Competitive Carrier proceeding took issue with the emphasis in NAR UC
 on "holding oneself out indiscriminately" to the public.101 The Commis-
 sion focused instead on the possible element of monopoly in the defini-
 tion. Relying on English common law, the Commission noted that ports
 and other places "affected with public interest" had been essential to
 commerce, and were scarce enough to be potential sources of monopoly
 income.'02 The Commission therefore proposed that a new definition
 should focus on the situation of the provider within the market, and not
 on the nature of the service itself.103
 The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking continued the Com-
 mission's disagreement with NAR UC 104 and sharpened the economic
 theory set out in the first Notice.10o The Commission first observed that
 much commercial regulation is economic in nature;'06 second, that the
 regulations in Title II can be viewed as economic;107 and finally, that at
 the time the Communications Act was enacted, telegraph and telephone
 services essentially were monopolistic and thus ripe for statutory con-
 trol. 08 The Commission deduced from these observations that Congress
 must have promulgated Title II as a means of checking monopolistic
 powers, and that entities subject to the regulations should therefore be
 defined in terms of market power.109 Thus, the FCC concluded that a
 common carrier under the Communications Act is an entity that is domi-
 nant in its market.110
 The Commission's definition of common carrier is wrong for three
 reasons. First, the definition contrasts markedly with the definition de-
 veloped and used through two centuries of common law. This definition
 looked solely at the nature of the service offered.'" Second, it contra-
 venes Congress's mandate that common carrier be interpreted in an ordi-
 nary sense.'12 Third, the Commission's redefinition of common carrier is
 101. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 365-66 & n.86 (1977).
 102. Id. at 364-65.
 103. Id. at 365.
 104. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 467 (1981).
 105. The Commission did note that many elements of the definition of common carrier had been
 derived from the liabilities inherent in that status; however, it dismissed them as irrelevant to the
 purposes of the Communications Act. Id. at 468.
 106. Id. at 448-50.
 107. Id. at 451-52.
 108. Id. at 459-60.
 109. Id. at 465-69.
 110. Id. at 465. The Commission acknowledged that this approach yielded the same result as
 forbearance towards non-dominant carriers. Id. at 463.
 111. See supra notes 64-76, 87-90 and accompanying text.
 112. Supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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 not supported by any legislative history."13
 When passing both the Mann-Elkins Act and the Communications
 Act, Congress was concerned over the monopolistic powers of communi-
 cation providers.114 The Commission's assertion, however, that
 "[n]owhere in the legislative history did Congress demonstrate an actual
 intention to extend this form of regulation to communications companies
 without market powers"'15 is untrue. The legislative histories of both the
 Mann-Elkins Act and the Communications Act discuss telephone serv-
 ices not connected to monopolies.16 Congress knew of these carriers
 and easily could have excluded them. Instead, Congress chose to man-
 date that "every common carrier shall" comply with the regulations of
 Title II.117
 V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REDEFINITION BY THE FCC
 If the Commission issues an order that formally adopts its market
 power definition of common carrier, someone will surely challenge the
 order. The federal court that reviews the order should reject any argu-
 ment by the FCC that the court should defer to the Commission's rea-
 sonable construction of the Communications Act.
 The starting point118 for judicial review of agency interpretation of
 statutory language is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
 Council, Inc. 119 In Chevron, the Supreme Court considered the legality
 of a definition promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency.120
 113. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text. Cf American Fed'n of Govt. Employees
 v. FLRA, 798 F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Where an agency's interpretation would deprive a
 statutory provision of virtually all affect, a court should not affirm the agency's interpretation absent
 'legislative history of exceptional clarity,' " (quoting American Fed'n of Govt. Employees v. FLRA,
 702 F.2d 1183, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).
 114. See 78 CONG. REC. 8822 (1934) (statement of Sen. Dill) (detailing size of telephone monop-
 oly); 45 CONG. REC. 5534 (1910) (statement of Rep. Underwood) (comparing telegraph and tele-
 phone monopolies to railroad monopolies).
 115. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 462 (1981).
 116. See 78 CONG. REC. 10,315 (1934) (statement of Sen. Rayburn) (reciting percentages of
 telephone and telegraph industry independent of monopolies); 45 CONG. REC. 6974 (1910) (letter
 from J. Ware to Sen. Smith) ("there are as many independent as Bell telephones in the United
 States").
 117. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting 47
 U.S.C. ? 203(a) (1982)) (emphasis supplied by the court). The FCC itself supported this position in
 its brief in American Tel. & Tel. v. FCC: "The agency has no authority to ignore these commands,
 even if market forces arguably are present which undercut the 'natural monopoly' justification for
 regulation." Brief of Federal Communications Commission at 49-50, American Tel. & Tel. v. FCC,
 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.) (No. 77-4057), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978) (quoted in MCI Teleconmmuni-
 cations, 765 F.2d at 1193).
 118. See Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1985).
 119. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
 120. Id. at 840.
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 In the course of its analysis, the Court set out a two-step procedure for
 "review[ing] an agency's construction of the statute which it adminis-
 ters."121 First, a court, using "traditional tools of statutory construc-
 tion,"'122 must ascertain whether "Congress has directly spoken to the
 precise issue at question. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
 of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
 unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."'23 Second, if the review-
 ing court determines that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
 to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
 answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."'24
 Chevron arguably "mark[s] a retreat from the close judicial scrutiny
 of agency decisions that had characterized the hard look doctrine pre-
 vailing until Chevron. "125 However, the deference accorded agencies in
 the second step of Chevron has not reduced judicial review of agency
 interpretation "to a hollow formality."'26 The second step is reached
 only if the first is not satisfied,'27 and in determining whether Congress
 addressed a precise issue the courts are "not required to grant any partic-
 ular deference to the agency's parsing of statutory language or its inter-
 pretation of legislative history."'28
 121. Id. at 842.
 122. Id. at 843 n.9.
 123. Id. at 842.
 124. Id. at 843.
 125. Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1985). But see Garland, Deregulation and
 Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507, 552-53 (1985) (Chevron and State Farm can be harmonized;
 "Chevron need not be read as a retreat from the commitment to hard look review expressed by the
 Court in State Farm. ").
 In Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the
 Supreme Court considered the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration's recission of its
 passive restraint standard. Id. at 39-40. The Court held that:
 the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
 action including a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."...
 [The reviewing court] must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of
 the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." ... Normally,
 an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
 Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
 the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
 the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
 product of agency expertise.
 Id. at 43. As Garland points out, such a review is quite substantive in nature. Garland, supra, at
 548-49.
 126. Note, Bursting the Bubble of Environmental Protection: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
 Resources Defense Council, Inc., 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 757, 758, 800 (1985). See American Fin.
 Servs. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Tamm, J., dissenting) (depicting majority as
 "anesthetized by misplaced deference to agency authority"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1185 (1986).
 127. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 908
 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
 128. Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir.
 1986) (quoting Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). See
This content downloaded from 165.123.155.5 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 15:46:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 516 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:501
 In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 129 the
 Supreme Court noted that "deference is not to be a device that emascu-
 lates the significance of judicial review."130 Indeed, lower courts'3 ap-
 plying Chevron's first step have followed the Court's earlier admonition
 that "the 'deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip
 into judicial inertia'. . . . [Reviewing courts] must not 'rubber stamp ...
 administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory
 mandate.' "132
 Determining the "precise issue" is the threshhold inquiry in apply-
 ing the first step of Chevron. Because the FCC wishes to redefine the
 term common carrier, the precise issue should be "how is a common car-
 rier defined?"'33 The Commission, however, would rather phrase the
 precise issue as "whether certain companies offering communication serv-
 ices in markets where they lack dominance or market power should be
 defined as common carriers and become subject to Title II regulation."'34
 The Commission could then argue that, because Congress did not ad-
 dress this exact point, the courts should defer to the Commission's con-
 struction of the statute.
 The Commission's phraseology should be rejected for two reasons.
 First, in applying the first step of Chevron, the Court has limited its con-
 sideration to whether Congress expressed an intent on the definition of
 the specific term at issue.'35 If Congress has expressed an intent on the
 definition of common carrier, "that is the end of the matter."136 Second,
 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1986) (agency interpre-
 tation not given presumption of correctness accorded to congressional legislation).
 129. 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
 130. Id. at 142-43.
 131. E.g., American Fed'n of Govt. Employees v. FLRA, 798 F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1986); Missouri v.
 Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 286-87 (8th Cir. 1986); Army Eng'r Center v. FLRA, 762 F.2d 409, 414
 (4th Cir. 1985).
 132. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (quoting Amer-
 ican Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965), and NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92
 (1965)).
 133. Similarly, in Chevron, the Court focused its step one examination on whether Congress
 expressed an intent as to the definition of a "stationary source," 467 U.S. at 851-59, and in Securities
 Industry, the Court focused its examination on whether Congress expressed an intent as to the defi-
 nition of the terms "note" or "other securities," 468 U.S. at 149-54.
 134. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, MAJOR MATTERS REPORT 40 (1982) (empha-
 sis added).
 135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. Indeed, much of the criticism of Chevron stems
 from the claim that by narrowing its scrutiny to one discrete section of the legislation, the Court
 ignores congressional intentions expressed by the enactment as a whole. Stukane, EPA 's Bubble
 Concept After Chevron v. NRDC: Who Is to Guard the Guards Themselves?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES
 LAW. 647, 650-52 (1985).
 136. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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 the FCC should not be allowed to bootstrap itself past the first step of
 Chevron by creating an illusory confusion of policies, thereby accruing
 the deference accorded agencies in the second step.'37
 The statute provides the first source for determining congressional
 intent as to the definition of common carrier.138 The Communications
 Act's sparse definition of common carrier probably will not satisfy Chev-
 ron's requirement for a clear expression of intent; thus a reviewing court
 should turn to the legislative history.139 The legislative history of section
 3(h) shows that Congress directly addressed the meaning of common car-
 rier and stated that it should be interpreted in the "ordinary sense of the
 term."140 An ordinary sense of the term common carrier had existed for
 almost three hundred years, from the courts of Queen Anne's Englandl41
 to the treatises in circulation when the Communications Act was
 passed.142 Throughout those three centuries the "ordinary meaning" of
 common carrier looked at the nature of the service offered and not at an
 individual provider's position in the marketplace.
 It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that the statutory
 language be interpreted according to its use at the time the legislation
 was passed.143 The legislators who enacted the Communications Act
 137. See Southern Pac. Pipe Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 796 F.2d 539, 542 (D.C. Cir.
 1986) (plaintiff not allowed to bootstrap by creating confusing meaning to avoid plain legislative
 meaning); Texas v. United States, 761 F.2d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1985) (declining respondent's invita-
 tion to relax judicial review of agency interpretation merely because it was reasonable, and instead
 applying first step of Chevron); see also Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 791 F.2d 959, 963 (D.C. Cir.
 1986) ("That the Congress' use of [a term] clashes somewhat with its allegedly primary goal ... is
 not a fatal flaw in the legislative scheme.").
 138. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir.) (general principle of statutory con-
 struction is to look first at the statutory language, citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
 Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).
 139. See Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[I]nquiry
 into congressional intent [for first step of Chevron] encompasses both statutory language and legisla-
 tive history."); Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that reading
 of statutory provision did not plainly indicate intent and turning to legislative history to satisfy first
 step of Chevron).
 140. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934), reprinted in [Current Service]
 Rad. Reg. (P & F) ? 10:1017. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. See also Securities Indus.
 Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 149 (1984) (Statutory silence on definition of term
 compels Court to "start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
 meaning of the words used.")
 141. Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249, 250, 91 Eng. Rep. 220, 220 (1710). See supra note 69 and
 accompanying text.
 142. W. ELLIOT, supra note 93; E. GODDARD, supra note 93. See supra note 93 and accompany-
 ing text.
 143. See Securities Indus., 468 U.S. at 150 (analyzing "ordinary meaning" of term as used by
 the Congress that passed legislation being scrutinized); Livermore v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1396, 1401-
 03 (9th Cir. 1984) (analyzing term according to usage at time legislation was passed); see also Pro-
 ceedings of the Forty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the Dist. of Columbia Circuit, 105 F.R.D. 251,
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 specifically pointed to the Interstate Commerce Act as the source of legal
 definitions for section 3.144 When Congress debated whether communi-
 cations providers could be characterized as common carriers, they de-
 bated the nature of the service provided, not the market dominance of
 individual entities.145 This debate illustrates Congress's understanding of
 what was and what was not a common carrier.
 Even today there is an "ordinary," if not exclusive meaning of the
 term common carrier. The Supreme Court'46 and lower federal courts147
 have continued to define "common carrier" by the nature of the service.
 No one, other than the Commission, focuses on the market dominance of
 individual providers.
 The Commission may try to avoid the first step and proceed directly
 to the deferential second step by arguing that Congress did not expressly
 forbid defining common carrier by relative market power.148 This disin-
 genuous reasoning ignores the tenet that it would be "absurd" to believe
 "that Congress delegated authority to vitiate . . its intent."149 This rea-
 soning also ignores the rationale for deferring to agency created defini-
 tions: that Congress has implicitly delegated responsibility to the agency
 by leaving a "gap" in the legislation.150 There is no gap in the history of
 section 3(h)-Congress has defined common carrier and the Commission
 cannot redefine it.
 Finally, the argument ignores what Congress did and what Congress
 continues to do.'51 In 1934 Congress drafted the Communications Act
 330-31 (1984) (statement of James Fitzpatrick) (intent of the Congress that enacted legislation is
 controlling).
 144. E.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8823 (1934) (statement of Sen. Dill); id. at 10,313 (statement of Rep.
 Rayburn). Cf Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 796 F.2d 503, 506 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (using legisla-
 tive history of prior enactments to clarify congressional intent, as directed by Congress), cert. denied,
 107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987).
 145. 45 CONG. REC. 5533-37 (1910). See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
 146. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979). See supra note 96 and accompany-
 ing text; see also Production Workers Union v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (using
 Supreme Court precedent to determine intent of Congress).
 147. E.g., National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C.
 Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
 148. See, e.g., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 462 (1981). The Chev-
 ron Court did comment that Congress did not foreclose the possibility of the agency-promulgated
 definition. 467 U.S. 837, 851 (1984). The Court, however, had already found that Congress had
 expressed no intent on the specific issue and was analyzing, as part of the second step, whether or not
 the agency definition was reasonable within the confines of what Congress legislated. Id. at 845.
 149. Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Montana v. Clark,
 749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 246 (1985).
 150. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
 grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
 151. Cf Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1984) (noting that
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 in absolute terms: "any person,"'52 and "every common carrier."153 The
 Commission has, in turn, pointed out the effect of this legislation to Con-
 gress and asked it to modify the language.154 In spite of these requests,
 as the District of Columbia Circuit noted in its consideration of the
 FCC's actions, Congress has not modified the Commission's mandate in
 this field.'5
 VI. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CREATED THROUGH
 DEREGULATION BY REDEFINITION
 The Commission's attempt at deregulation by redefinition not only
 contravenes congressional intent, it is also unwise policy and may pre-
 vent implementation of discrete congressional goals. For example, sec-
 tion 310(a) of the Communications Act prohibits foreign ownership of
 common carrier fixed radio services,156 including both the earth sta-
 tions157 used to communicate with domestic satellites and the domestic
 satellites themselves.158 The stated congressional purpose of this prohibi-
 tion was to preserve independent communications that would not be sus-
 ceptible to foreign influence, and Congress placed a "heavy burden" on
 the FCC to carry out this goal.159 Under the Commission's new market-
 oriented definition, however, neither earth stations nor domestic satellites
 are considered common carriers; therefore, the Commission has allowed
 the sale of U.S. satellite facilities to a foreign entity.60?
 On another level, the FCC's new approach to defining common car-
 Congress did not originally adopt the approach promulgated by the agency, "and it has adhered to
 that rejection ever since").
 152. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 3(h), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 (codified as
 amended at 47 U.S.C. ? 153(h) (1982)) (emphasis added).
 153. Id. ? 203, 48 Stat. at 1070-71 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 203 (1982)) (emphasis added).
 154. E.g., Federal Communications Commission, FCC Legislative Proposals 5-8 (1986).
 155. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
 156. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 310, 48 Stat. 1064, 1086 (codified as
 amended at 47 U.S.C. ? 310(b) (1982)).
 157. 47 C.F.R. ? 25.103(d) (1986).
 158. "Domestic satellites" refers to satellites serving only points located inside the United States
 and its territories. Cf Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-gov-
 ernmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 845 (1972). Service between points located in more than one
 country is coordinated by the intergovernmental organization INTELSAT, although the United
 States does favor allowing some privately owned service in the North Atlantic. Rein, McDonald,
 Adams, Frank & Nielsen, Implementation of a U.S. "Free Entry" Initiative for Transatlantic Satellite
 Facilities: Problems, Pitfalls, and Possibilities, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 459, 464 (1985)
 [hereinafter Rein].
 159. Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Congress has imposed heavy obliga-
 tions upon FCC to discover and prevent alien or improper control of radio broadcasting stations.).
 See generally Rein, supra note 158, at 473-74.
 160. Letter from James R. Keegan to Kenneth E. Hardman, Application File No. 1302-DSC-P/
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 riers is confusing to those who are regulated. Market power is difficult to
 predict.161 An entity wishing either to enter a new market or to expand
 its position in an existing market may not be able to determine in ad-
 vance whether it will be subject to FCC regulations. Further uncertainty
 is added by fluctuations in market power that may render an entity a
 common carrier only at certain times. Such uncertainty is a significant
 flaw in any regulatory system.
 CONCLUSION
 The FCC faces an everbroadening array of new communications
 services that fall within Congress's definition of common carrier. The
 FCC also faces pressure from an economic theory that suggests that the
 regulatory system applicable to common carriers will only inhibit these
 new services. Heeding the cry of deregulation, the FCC has proposed to
 achieve deregulation by redefining the term common carrier in terms of
 market dominance. Only those carriers that can dominate the market
 would be regulated as common carriers.
 This note has demonstrated that the FCC's attempts should be re-
 jected. When Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934, it had
 a specific definition of common carrier in mind. That definition, relating
 to the nature of the service rather than the position of the provider in the
 market, was based on the ordinary meaning of the term as it had devel-
 oped over three centuries. It is possible that a new definition would bet-
 ter serve an agency facing current economic and technological
 developments.162 However, if the policies of Congress have become out-
 dated or obsolete, Congress, not the FCC, is responsible for replacing
 them.
 Phil Nichols
 L-82 (Sept. 23, 1982). See also In re Application of Satellite Business Sys., No. 1091-DSS-MP/ML-
 83 (Nov. 2, 1982) (authorizing sale of satellite capacity to foreign entities).
 161. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 465 n.43 (1981). See Baxter, The
 Definition and Measurement of Market Power in Industries Characterized by Rapidly Developing and
 Changing Technologies, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 717, 720-21 (1984) (measurable market share of high-
 tech industries may not reflect important research and development share of industry).
 162. Cf Geller, Communications Law--A Half Century Later, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 73, 83
 (1985) (faulting Congress for failing to provide guidance in new fields of communication services).
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